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PAYOFFS-BELIEFS DUALITY AND THE VALUE OF INFORMATION1
MICHEL DE LARA∗ AND OLIVIER GOSSNER†2
Abstract. In decision problems under incomplete information, actions (identified to payoff vectors indexed by states of3
nature) and beliefs are naturally paired by bilinear duality. We exploit this duality to analyze the value of information, using4
concepts and tools from convex analysis. We define the value function as the support function of the set of available actions:5
the subdifferential at a belief is the set of optimal actions at this belief; the set of beliefs at which an action is optimal is the6
normal cone of the set of available actions at this point. Our main results are 1) a necessary and sufficient condition for positive7
value of information 2) global estimates of the value of information of any information structure from local properties of the8
value function and of the set of optimal actions taken at the prior belief only. We apply our results to the marginal value of9
information at the null, that is, when the agent is close to receiving no information at all, and we provide conditions under10
which the marginal value of information is infinite, null, or positive and finite.11
Keywords: value of information, convex analysis, payoffs-beliefs duality.12
AMS classification: 46N10, 91B06.13
1. Introduction. The value of a piece of information to an economic agent depends on the information14
at hand, on the agent’s prior on the state of nature, and on the decision problem faced. These elements are15
intrinsically tied, and separating the influence of one of them from that of the others is not straightforward.16
Most information rankings are either uniform among agents or restricted to certain classes of agents.17
Blackwell’s comparison of experiments [8], for instance, is uniform; it states that an information structure is18
more informative than another if all agents, no matter their available choices and preferences, weakly prefer19
the former to the latter. Papers [26, 31, 12] are examples that build information rankings based on restricted20
sets of decision problems. The flip side of this approach is that information rankings are silent as to the21
dependency of the value of a fixed piece information on the agent’s preferences and available choices. They22
do not tell us what makes information more or less valuable to an arbitrary agent, and neither can they23
identify the agents who value a given piece of information more than others. If we want to answer this type24
of questions, we need to examine carefully how information, priors, decisions and preferences come into play.25
The effect of priors and evidence on beliefs is well understood. Given a prior belief, and after receiving26
some information, an agent forms a posterior belief. Posterior beliefs average out to the prior belief, and27
information acquisition can usefully be represented by the distribution of these posterior beliefs (see, e.g. [9,28
3]).29
In any decision problem, to each decision and state of nature corresponds a payoff. The decision problem30
can thus be represented as a set of available vector payoffs, where each payoff is indexed by a state of nature31
[7]. Given a posterior belief, the agent makes a decision that maximizes her expected utility so that, to32
each (posterior) belief of the agent corresponds an expected utility at this belief. The corresponding map33
from beliefs to expected payoffs is called the value function. The value of a piece of information, defined as34
the difference in expected utilities from having or not having the information at hand, is thus the difference35
between the expectation of the value function at the posterior and at the prior, and is nonnegative. Thus,36
the value function fully captures the agent’s preferences for information.37
In this paper, we make use of convex analysis [33] to exploit a bilinear duality structure between payoffs38
and beliefs, that gives expected payoff [17]. Primal variables are payoffs vectors, dual variables are beliefs39
(or, more generally, signed measures) and the value function appears as the (restriction to beliefs of the)40
support function of the set of available vector payoffs. This provides a correspondence between convex41
analysis concepts and tools, on the one hand, and economic objects, on the other hand. The set of beliefs42
compatible with an optimal action is related to the normal cone of the set of available vector payoffs at43
this optimal action. The subdifferential of the value function at any belief can be represented as the set of44
optimal choice of vector payoffs at this belief.45
We express the value of information according to the influence it has on decisions. We provide three46
upper and lower bounds on the value of information.47
In the first upper and lower bounds, we characterize information with a positive value. We show that48
information has a positive value if and only if at least one of the optimal actions at the prior becomes49
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suboptimal for some of the posteriors. We thus define the confidence set at a prior belief p¯ as the set of50
posterior beliefs for which all optimal actions at p¯ remain optimal. Our result says that information has51
positive value if and only if posterior beliefs fall outside of the confidence set with positive probability.52
This result generalizes insights from [23] and [30], who had already noticed that information can only be53
useful insofar as it influences choices. We provide corresponding lower and upper bounds to the value of54
information.55
In the second bounds, we express the fact that the value of information is maximal when it influences56
actions the most, which happens when information breaks indifferences between several choices. We show57
that, when this is the case, the value of information can be suitably measured by an expected distance58
between the prior and the posterior. There are several optimal actions at the prior, and information that59
allows to break indifferences has highest value.60
Finally, our third bounds apply to cases in which the agent’s optimal choice is a smooth function of her61
belief around the prior. We show that, in this situation, the value function is also smooth around the prior,62
and the value of information is essentially a quadratic function of the expected distance between the prior63
and the posterior. In this intermediate case, information impacts actions in a continuous way. The optimal64
actions at the prior belief and at a posterior close to it are themselves close; so choosing one instead of the65
other has a mild, albeit positive, impact on the expected payoff.66
In a finite decision problem — such as shopping behavior [28] or residential location [29] — at any given67
prior the agent either has an optimal action that is locally constant, or is indifferent between several optimal68
choices. The first and second upper and lower bounds are particularly useful in finite choice problems. The69
third bounds are most useful in decision problems with a continuum of choices, such as scoring rules [11] or70
investment decisions [1].71
The paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 presents the model and introduces the duality between72
actions/payoffs and beliefs. The main results are presented in Sect. 3. Sect. 4 is devoted to an illustration73
of our results in an insurance example and Sect. 5 to applications to the question of marginal value of74
information. Sect. 6 concludes by discussing related literature. The Appendix contains background on75
convex analysis and the proofs.76
2. Model, payoffs-beliefs duality and information. We consider the classical question of an agent77
who faces a decision problem under imperfect information on a state of nature. The set of states of nature78
is a finite set K. We identify the set Σ of signed measures on K with RK . The agent holds a prior belief p¯79
with full support in the set ∆ = ∆(K) ⊂ Σ = RK of probability distributions over K. We identify ∆ with80
the simplex of RK .81
A decision problem is given by an arbitrary compact choice set D and by a continuous payoff func-82
tion g : D × K → R. Consistent with the framework of [8], we define the set of actions as the compact83
convex subspace of RK given by the closed convex hull :84
(2.1) A = co{(g(d, k))
k∈K
, d ∈ D} ⊂ RK .85
The convexity of A is justified by allowing the agent to randomize over actions.86
Duality between actions/payoffs and beliefs. The scalar product between a vector v ∈ RK and a87
signed measure s ∈ RK is 〈s , v〉 = ∑k∈K skvk. This scalar product induces a duality between payoffs/actions88
and beliefs. Such a duality is at the core of a series of works in nonexpected utility theory, such as [21, 27, 14].89
Under belief p ∈ ∆, the decision maker chooses a decision d ∈ D that maximizes ∑k pkg(d, k), or,90
equivalently, an action a ∈ A that maximizes 〈p , a〉, and the corresponding expected payoff ismaxa∈A 〈p , a〉 ∈91
R. We define the value function vA : ∆→ R by:92
(2.2) vA(p) = max
a∈A
〈p , a〉 , ∀p ∈ ∆ .93
The value function vA : ∆→ R is convex — as the supremum of the family of affine functions 〈· , a〉 for a ∈ A94
— and continuous — as its effective domain is the whole convex set ∆ [22, p. 175].95
Given a belief p ∈ ∆, we let A⋆(p) ⊂ A be the set of optimal actions at belief p, given by96
(2.3) A⋆(p) = argmax
a′∈A
〈p , a′〉 = {a ∈ A | ∀a′ ∈ A , 〈p , a′〉 ≤ 〈p , a〉} .97
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Geometrically, the set A⋆(p) is the (exposed) face of A in the direction p ∈ ∆ (see (A.3) in Appendix for a98
proper definition). The set A⋆(p) is nonempty, closed and convex (as A is convex and compact).99
Conversely, an outside observer can make inferences on the agent’s beliefs from observed actions. For an100
action a ∈ A, the set ∆⋆A(a) of beliefs revealed by action a is the set of all beliefs for which a is an optimal101
action, given by:102
(2.4) ∆⋆A(a) = {p ∈ ∆ | ∀a′ ∈ A , 〈p , a′〉 ≤ 〈p , a〉} .103
Geometrically, the set ∆⋆A(a) is the intersection with ∆ of the normal cone NA(a) (see (A.6) for a proper104
definition).105
Obviously, given a ∈ A and p ∈ ∆, a ∈ A⋆(p) iff p ∈ ∆⋆A(a), as both express that action a is optimal106
under belief p.107
Information structure. We follow [9, 8], and we describe information through a distribution of pos-108
terior beliefs that average to the prior belief. Hence, given the prior belief p¯, we define an information109
structure as a random variable q, defined over a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and with values in ∆, describing110
the agent’s posterior beliefs, and such that (where E denotes the expectation operator with respect to P)111
(2.5) q : (Ω,F ,P)→ ∆ , E [q] = p¯ .112
Given the action set A in (2.1) and the information structure q in (2.5), the value of information VoIA(q)113
is the difference between the expected payoff for an agent who receives information according to q and one114
whose prior belief is p¯. It is given by:115
(2.6) VoIA(q) = E
[
vA(q)
] − vA(p¯) .116
The following example illustrates relations between the set A of actions and the value function vA.117
Example 1. Consider two states of nature, K = {1, 2}, decisions D = {d1, d2, d3, d4}, and payoffs given118
by Table 1. In this case, A is the convex hull of the four points (3, 0), (2, 2), (0, 5/2) and (0, 0). The value
k = 1 k = 2
d1 3 0
d2 2 2
d3 0 5/2
d4 0 0
Table 1
Table of payoffs
119
function vA, expressed as a function of the probability p of state 2, is the maximum of the following three120
affine functions: 3(1−p), 2, and 5p/2. Action (3, 0) is optimal for p ≤ 1/3, (2, 2) is optimal for p ∈ [1/3, 4/5],121
and (0, 5/2) is optimal for p ≥ 4/5. Both the set A and the function vA are represented in Figure 1.122
At p = 4/5, the optimal actions are (2, 2), (0, 5/2), and their convex combinations. At this point, the123
mapping vA is not differentiable. However, its subdifferential — which can be visualized as the set of straight124
lines that are below vA and tangent to it at p = 4/5 — is still well defined and corresponds precisely to the125
optimal actions A⋆(4/5), i.e. the convex hull of {(2, 2), (0, 5/2)}.126
The set ∆⋆A(3, 0) of beliefs revealed by action (3, 0) consists of the range p ∈ [0, 1/3], and it can be seen127
on the right side of Figure 1 that, for this range of probabilities, the action (3, 0) is optimal and that vA is128
linear and equal to 3(1− p).129
3. On the value of information. In this section, we relate the geometry of the set A of actions130
in (2.1) with the behavior of the agent around the prior belief p¯, with differentiability properties of the value131
function vA in (2.2) at the prior belief p¯, and with the value of information VoIA in (2.6). This approach132
allows us to derive bounds on the value of information that depend on how information influences actions.133
First, in Subsect. 3.1, we consider information that does not allow us to eliminate optimal actions. We134
introduce the confidence set as the set of posterior beliefs at which all optimal actions at the prior remain135
3
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Fig. 1. The set A of actions on the left, and the value function vA on the right. Each of the four arrows on the left
represents an action a such that p = 4/5 belongs to the set ∆⋆
A
(a) of beliefs revealed by action a. On the right side, these four
actions (each attached to an arrow) can be seen as four elements of the subdifferential of the value function vA at p = 4/5.
The set ∆⋆
A
(3, 0) = [0, 1/3] can be visualized both as the normal cone at (3, 0) on the left side, and as the range of values of
probabilities p for which (3, 0) is optimal on the right.
optimal. We show that information is valuable if and only if, with positive probability, it can lead to a136
posterior outside this set. Therefore, information is valuable whenever it allows to eliminate some actions137
from the set of optimal ones.138
Second, in Subsect. 3.2, we consider the somewhat opposite case of tie-breaking information. This139
corresponds to situations in which the agent is indifferent between several actions, and the information140
allows her to select among them. We show that the value of information can be related to an expected141
distance between the prior and the posterior, provided that posterior beliefs move in these tie-breaking142
directions.143
These two first approaches are suitable in finite decision problems where the value function is piecewise144
linear. In the third approach, in Subsect. 3.3, we look at situations in which the optimal action is locally145
unique around the prior and depends on information in a continuous and smooth way. There, we show that146
the value of information can essentially be measured as an expected square distance from the prior to the147
posterior. This approach is particularly adapted to cases in which the space of actions is sufficiently rich,148
and where small changes of beliefs lead to corresponding small changes of actions.149
3.1. Valuable information. Our first task is to formalize the idea that useful information is informa-150
tion that affects optimal choices (quoting [23], “Information is of value only if it can affect action”). Since151
there are potentially several optimal actions at a prior belief p¯ and at a posterior p, there are in principle152
many ways to formalize this idea.153
We say that a belief p is in the confidence set ∆cA(p¯) of prior belief p¯ iff all optimal actions at p¯ (those154
in A⋆(p¯)) are also optimal at p. In other words, we define the confidence set of prior belief p¯ by:155
(3.1) ∆cA(p¯) =
⋂
a∈A⋆(p¯)
∆⋆A(a) .156
Another way to look at this notion is to consider an observer who sees choices by the decision maker:157
4
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p ∈ ∆cA(p¯) when none of the actions chosen by the agent at prior belief p¯ would lead the observer to refute158
the possibility that the agent has belief p.159
The notion of a confidence set allows for the characterization of valuable information as follows.160
Proposition 3.1 (Valuable information). For every information structure q as in (2.5), we have:161
VoIA(q) = 0 ⇐⇒ ∃a⋆ ∈ A⋆(p¯) , a⋆ ∈ A⋆(q) , P− a.s.(3.2a)162
⇐⇒ q ∈ ∆cA(p¯) , P− a.s.(3.2b)163164
165
In Example 1, the confidence set at p¯ = 1/2 is the closed interval [1/3, 4/5] (the flat portion of the166
function to the right of Figure 1). Information is valuable whenever, with some positive probability, the167
posterior does not belong to this set. When the posterior falls in this set with probability one, the value168
function averaged at the prior precisely equals the value at prior belief p¯, hence information has no value.169
It is relatively straightforward to see that if all posteriors remain in the confidence set, information is170
valueless. In fact, when this is the case, the same action is optimal for all of the posteriors, which means171
that the agent can play this action, while ignoring the new information, and obtain the same value. The172
proposition shows that the converse result also holds: the value of information is positive whenever posteriors173
fall outside of the confidence set with some positive probability.174
More can be said about estimates on the value of information. To do so, we introduce an ε-neighborhood175
of the confidence set ∆cA(p¯). For ε > 0, let176
(3.3) ∆cA,ε(p¯) = {q ∈ ∆ | d
(
q,∆cA(p¯)
)
< ε} where d(q,∆cA(p¯)) = inf
p∈∆cA(p¯)
‖p− q‖.177
This leads us to a first estimate of the value of information.178
Theorem 3.2 (Bound on the value of information based on confidence sets). For every ε > 0, there179
exist positive constants CA and cp¯,A,ε such that, for every information structure q as in (2.5):180
(3.4) CAE
[
d
(
q,∆cA(p¯)
)] ≥ VoIA(q) ≥ cp¯,A,εP{q 6∈ ∆cA,ε(p¯)} .181
182
The upper bound tells us that the value of information is bounded by (a constant times) the expected183
distance from the posterior to the confidence set at the prior. In particular, it is bounded by the expected184
distance from the posterior to the prior itself. The lower bound is a converse result, but in which we need185
to replace the confidence set by some ε-neighborhood. It shows us that the value of information is bounded186
below by (a constant times) the probability that the posterior is at least distance ε from the confidence set,187
and, therefore, it is also larger than the expected distance from the posterior to this ε-neighborhood of the188
confidence set. Both the lower and upper bounds depend on the confidence set ∆cA(p¯) in (3.1), which can be189
computed locally at prior belief p¯. On the other hand, they apply to all information structures. The caveat190
is that the multiplicative constants CA and cp¯,A,ε in (3.4) depend on global, and not just local, properties of191
the action set A.192
3.2. Undecided. We now consider situations in which information influences actions the most. Those193
are situations of indifference in which, at the prior belief p¯, the agent is undecided between several optimal194
actions. A small piece of information can then be enough to break this indifference. As shown by the195
following proposition (whose proof we do not give, as it is well-known in convex analysis [22, p. 251]), the196
value function then exhibits a kink at prior belief p¯.197
Proposition 3.3. The two following conditions are equivalent:198
• the set A⋆(p¯) of optimal actions at the prior belief p¯ in (2.3) contains more than one element;199
• the value function vA in (2.2) is nondifferentiable (in the standard sense) at the prior belief p¯.200
Cases of indifference are typical of situations with a finite number of action choices. Coming back to201
Example 1, the agent is undecided for p¯ = 1/2 and p¯ = 3/4: at these priors, the agent has several optimal202
choices, and the value function is nondifferentiable. At all other priors, the optimal choice is unique, and203
the value function is differentiable.204
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At prior beliefs p¯ satisfying the conditions of Proposition 3.3, the convexity gap of the value function vA205
is maximal in the directions in which it is nondifferentiable. This allows us to derive a second bound on the206
value of information. For this purpose, we call indifference kernel ΣiA(p¯) at prior belief p¯ the vector space of207
signed measures that are orthogonal to all differences of optimal actions A⋆(p¯) at p¯, that is,208
(3.5) ΣiA(p¯) = [A
⋆(p¯)−A⋆(p¯)]⊥ .209
Beliefs in the indifference kernel ΣiA(p¯) do not break any of the ties in A
⋆(p¯), since p ∈ ΣiA(p¯) ⇐⇒ 〈p , a〉 =210
〈p , a′〉 , ∀(a, a′) ∈ A⋆(p¯)2. We note the inclusion ∆cA(p¯) ⊂ ΣiA(p¯) ∩ ∆ as every element in the confidence211
set is necessarily in the indifference kernel and in the simplex of probability measures.212
Recall that a seminorm on the signed measures Σ onK, identified with RK , is a mapping ‖·‖ : RK → R+213
which satisfies the requirements of a norm, except that the vector subspace {s ∈ RK | ‖s‖ = 0}— called the214
kernel of the seminorm ‖ · ‖ — is not necessarily reduced to the null vector.215
Theorem 3.4 (Bounds on the value of information for the undecided agent). There exists a positive216
constant CA and a seminorm ‖ · ‖Σi
A
(p¯) with kernel Σ
i
A(p¯), the indifference kernel in (3.5), such that, for217
every information structure q as in (2.5):218
(3.6) CAE ‖q− p¯‖ ≥ VoIA(q) ≥ VoIA⋆(p¯)(q) ≥ E ‖q− p¯‖Σi
A
(p¯) .219
220
For p¯ = 1/2 or p¯ = 3/4 in Example 1, Theorem 3.4 shows that the value of information for these priors221
is bounded above and below by a constant times the norm-1 between the prior and the posterior. Since any222
small amount of information allows to break the indifference between the optimal actions at these priors,223
information is very valuable.224
The lower bound in Theorem 3.4 shows that a lower bound of the value of information is the expectation225
of a seminorm of the distance between the prior belief and the posterior belief. To understand the role226
of the kernel ΣiA(p¯) of this seminorm, let us first consider the set of beliefs in this set. A posterior q is227
in ΣiA(p¯) = [A
⋆(p¯) − A⋆(p¯)]⊥ if and only if, for any two optimal actions a, a′ ∈ A⋆(p¯), 〈q , a〉 = 〈q , a′〉. In228
words, posteriors that do not break any of the ties in A⋆(p¯) might not be valuable to the agent. On the other229
hand, Theorem 3.4 tells us that all other directions — i.e., those that allow at least one of the ties in A⋆(p¯)230
to be broken — are valuable to the agent, and furthermore, in these directions, the value of information231
behaves like an expected distance from the prior to the posterior.232
The upper bound says that the value of information is bounded by an expected distance from the prior233
to the posterior, and the inner inequality states that the value of information with decision set A is at least234
as large as with action set A⋆(p¯).235
Note that the bounds on Theorem 3.4 rely on the indifference kernel ΣiA(p¯) in (3.5), which can be236
computed directly from the set A⋆(p¯) by (3.5). The multiplicative constant CA in (3.6), however, depends237
on more global properties of the action set A.238
3.3. Flexible. Finally, we consider the case in which there is a unique optimal action for each belief239
in the range considered, and this action depends smoothly on the belief. More precisely, we assume that,240
around the prior, optimal actions smoothly depend in a 1-1 way on the belief. This assumption is met when,241
for instance, the decision problem faced by the agent is a scoring rule [11], or an investment problem [1, 12].242
Our first step is to characterize a class of situations of interest, in which the agent’s optimal action243
depends smoothly on her belief. The following proposition offers three alternative characterizations of these244
situations, based 1) on the local behavior of the agent’s optimal optimal choices, 2) on local properties of245
the geometry of the boundary of the set of actions, and 3) on local second differentiability properties of the246
value function. For background on geometric convex analysis, the reader can consult §A.2 in the Appendix.247
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that the action set A in (2.1) has boundary ∂A which is a C2 submanifold248
of RK of dimension |K| − 1. The three following conditions are equivalent:249
1. The set-valued mapping of optimal actions at the prior belief p¯ in (2.3)250
(3.7) A⋆ : ∆⇒ ∂A , p 7→ A⋆(p)251
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is a local diffeomorphism1 at the prior belief p¯;252
2. The set A⋆(p¯) of optimal actions at the prior belief p¯ in (2.3) is reduced to a singleton at which the253
curvature of the action set A is positive;254
3. The value function vA in (2.2) is twice differentiable at the prior belief p¯, with positive definite255
Hessian at p¯.256
In this case, we say that the agent is flexible at p¯.257
Theorem 3.6 (Bounds on the VoI for the flexible agent). If the agent is flexible at prior belief p¯, then258
there exist positive constants Cp¯,A and cp¯,A such that, for every information structure q as in (2.5):259
(3.8) Cp¯,AE ||q− p¯||2 ≥ VoIA(q) ≥ cp¯,AE ||q− p¯||2 .260
261
Theorem 3.6 shows that, in the case of a flexible agent, the value of information is essentially given by the262
expected square distance between the prior and the posterior, up to some multiplicative constant. One of the263
strengths of the theorem is that its assumption that the agent is flexible is a local one, whereas its conclusion264
is global, as it applies to all information structures. On the other hand, the multiplicative constants Cp¯,A and265
cp¯,A in (3.8) themselves depend on the global behavior of the value function, and hence cannot be inferred266
from local properties only.267
4. An insurance example. In this example, we study an insurance problem and illustrate how the268
results of Sect. 3 apply. The insuree chooses whether to insure, or not, and at which indemnity level to269
insure if she does. The uncertainty is about the level of risk she incurs, and she may receive some partial270
information about it.271
Example 2. The model is drawn from the classical insurance framework (see [6, 18]).272
An insuree faces the decision of partially or fully insuring a good of value ̟ against the possibility of its273
total loss. Pricing is assumed to be linear, so that, for an indemnity I, the insurance company charges274
(4.1) P (I) = αI + f where α ∈]0, 1[ , f > 0 .275
In exchange for the premium P (I), the insuree gets compensation of an amount I from the insurance company276
in case of a loss. For the range of wealth w considered, the insuree’s utility function u is considered to have277
constant absolute risk aversion R, that is,278
(4.2) u(w) = 1− e−Rw .279
By (2.1), the set of actions is the closed convex hull280
(4.3) A = co
{(
u(̟), u(0)
)
,
(
u
(− P (I) +̟), u(− P (I) + I))}281
where, by convention, the first coordinate corresponds to no loss and the second corresponds to the loss.282
The insuree’s subjective perception that a loss may arise is p ∈]0, 1[, probability of loss. The insuree283
chooses either not to insure, and obtains expected utility284
(4.4a) U0(p) = (1− p)u(̟) + pu(0) = (1− p)
(
1− e−R̟) ,285
or to insure for an indemnity I > 0 that maximizes the expected utility286
(4.4b) U(p, I) = (1− p)u(− P (I) +̟)+ pu(− P (I) + I) = 1− pe−R(−P (I)+I) − (1− p)e−R(−P (I)+̟) .287
288
The question now becomes whether no insurance or a positive level of indemnity is chosen.289
1In particular, the set A⋆(p) is a singleton for all p ∈ ∆, in which case we identify a singleton set with its single element.
7
Proposition 4.1. There exists a threshold belief p∗ ∈]0, 1[ and a smooth function Iˆ : [p∗, 1] →]0,+∞[290
such that291
1. for p < p∗, it is optimal not to insure,292
2. for p = p∗, the insuree is indifferent between no insurance and insurance at the positive indemnity293
level Iˆ(p∗),294
3. for p > p∗, it is optimal to insure at the positive indemnity level Iˆ(p).295
Proof. It is easy to see that the function I ∈ R 7→ U(p, I) in (4.4b) is strictly concave with a unique296
maximum, characterized by ∂U/∂I = 0, and achieved at297
(4.5) Iˆ(p) = ̟ − 1
R
ln(
1− p
p
α
1− α ) , ∀p ∈]0, 1[ .298
We denote by pˆ the unique p ∈]0, 1[ such that Iˆ(p) > 0 ⇐⇒ p > pˆ. To determine whether no insurance or299
a nonnegative level of indemnity is chosen, we introduce the difference of expected utilities300
(4.6) δ(p) = max
I≥0
U(p, I)− U0(p) =
{
U(p, 0)− U0(p) if p ≤ pˆ ,
U
(
p, Iˆ(p)
)− U0(p) if p ≥ pˆ .301
We study the behavior of the function δ when p is small and when p is close to one. After computa-302
tion, we find that, for all p ∈ [0, 1] , U(p, 0) − U0(p) = −
(
eRf − 1)(p + (1 − p)e−R̟) < 0. Therefore,303
δ(p) < 0 for all p ≤ pˆ. On the other hand, when p goes to 1, δ(p) goes to 1 because U0(p) → 0 and304
U
(
p, Iˆ(p)
)
= (1− p)
(
1− e−R
(
−P (Iˆ(p))+̟
))
+ p
(
1− e−R
(
−P (Iˆ(p))+Iˆ(p)
))
= 1− (1− p)( 1−p
p
α
1−α
)α
eR(1−α)̟ −305
p
(
1−p
p
α
1−α
)1−α
e−R(1−α)̟ → 1 (as α ∈]0, 1[). As a consequence, we can define p∗ = inf {p ∈ [0, 1] | δ(p) > 0},306
which belongs to [pˆ, 1[. Indeed, since δ(p) < 0 for p ≤ pˆ, we deduce that p∗ ≥ pˆ; and p∗ < 1 because δ(p)→ 1307
when p→ 1. We now check that p∗ and Iˆ in (4.5) satisfy the three assertions of the Proposition.308
By definition of p∗ and of the function δ, for p < p∗, it is optimal not to insure.309
As the function δ is continuous, we have δ(p∗) = 0 and the insuree is indifferent between no insurance310
and insurance at the positive indemnity level Iˆ(p∗).311
To finish, we will now show that δ(p) > 0 when p > p∗, leading to the conclusion that it is optimal to312
insure at the positive indemnity level Iˆ(p). Indeed, for p > p∗, we have313
δ(p) = δ(p)− δ(p∗) as δ(p∗) = 0314
= U
(
p, Iˆ(p)
)− U(p, Iˆ(p∗))+ U(p, Iˆ(p∗))− U0(p)− [U(p∗, Iˆ(p∗))− U0(p∗)] by (4.6)315
> U
(
p, Iˆ(p∗)
)− U0(p)− U(p∗, Iˆ(p∗))+ U0(p∗) as U(p, Iˆ(p))− U(p, Iˆ(p∗)) > 0316
by definition of the maximizer Iˆ(p) and since Iˆ(p) > Iˆ(p∗) ≥ 0 as p > p∗ ≥ pˆ317
= (1− p)[u(− P (Iˆ(p∗)) +̟)− u(̟)]+ p[u(− P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗))− u(0)]318
− (1 − p∗)[u(− P (Iˆ(p∗)) +̟)− u(̟)]− p∗[u(− P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗))− u(0)] by (4.4)319
= (p− p∗)
[[
u
(− P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗))− u(0)]+ [u(̟)− u(− P (Iˆ(p∗)) +̟)]] ≥ 0320
321
since both terms between inner brackets are increments of the increasing function u, where −P (Iˆ(p∗)) +322
Iˆ(p∗) ≥ 0 (to be seen below) and P (Iˆ(p∗)) ≥ 0 (because Iˆ(p∗) ≥ 0). If we had −P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗) < 0, we323
would arrive at the contradiction that 0 = δ(p∗) = (1−p∗)[u(−P (Iˆ(p∗))+̟)−u(̟)]+p∗[u(−P (Iˆ(p∗))+324
Iˆ(p∗)
)−u(0)] < 0 since both terms between brackets are (negative) increments of the increasing function u.325
Now, we assume that the insuree has access to a small piece of information concerning her probability326
of loss. Once informed, she discovers that the probability q of a loss is either p − ε or p + ε, where both327
possibilities are equally likely and ε > 0 is a small positive number. Let v(q) be the utility of the insuree328
with beliefs q, once the optimal policy is chosen:329
(4.7) v(q) = max
{
U0(q),max
I≥0
U(q, I)
}
.330
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As v is the value function in (2.2), the value of information in the decision problem is defined as the expected331
utility with the information minus the expected utility absent the information, as in (2.6):332
(4.8) VoI(ε) =
1
2
v(p+ ε) +
1
2
v(p− ε)− v(p) .333
Note that VoI(ε) measures the value of information in terms of utility; the equivalent measure in monetary334
terms would be − 1
R
ln(1 −VoI(ε)). The following proposition characterizes the value of a small amount of335
information, in terms of the agent’s optimal insurance behavior.336
Proposition 4.2. Depending on the probability of loss p, the value of information for small ε behaves337
as follows:338
1. In the confident case, for p < p∗, VoI(ε) = 0 for small ε,339
2. In the undecided case, for p = p∗, VoI(ε) ∼ C∗ε for a constant C∗ > 0,340
3. In the flexible case, for p > p∗, VoI(ε) ∼ C(p)ε2 for a constant C(p) > 0.341
Proof. The confident and undecided cases are immediate consequences of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4, together342
with Proposition 4.1. In the flexible case, the optimal indemnity level is given by Iˆ(p) > 0, and the function343
Iˆ :]p∗, 1]→]0,+∞[ in (4.5) is differentiable with dIˆ(p)
dp
6= 0. The set of optimal actions A⋆(p) in (2.3) is reduced344
to the single point A⋆(p) =
(
1−e−R
(
−P
(
Iˆ(p)
)
+̟)
)
, 1−e−R
(
−P
(
Iˆ(p)
)
+Iˆ(p)
))
. As the curve p ∈]p∗, 1] 7→ A⋆(p)345
has a derivative that never vanishes, we deduce that it is a local diffeomorphism (onto its image in ∂A) at p,346
and Theorem 3.6 applies.347
The results of Proposition 4.1 are intuitive. First, a small piece of information is valueless if the agent348
is not buying insurance. For such agents, a small bit of information does not affect behavior, as even bad349
news is not enough to trigger insurance purchase. For an undecided agent who is indifferent between no350
insurance and insurance at a positive indemnity level I(p∗), a small piece of information is enough to break351
the indifference and significantly influences her behavior; this is the situation in which information is the352
most valuable. Finally, for an agent who takes a positive level of indemnity, information may affect the353
level of indemnity chosen. But, because the change of indemnity level is itself of order ε, and the indemnity354
level I(p∗) is ε-optimal at the posterior, the value of information is a second order in ε.355
Figure 2 represents the set A of actions (4.3) to the left, and the corresponding value function v = vA356
in (4.7) to the right. In the representation of A, the horizontal axis corresponds to the payoff without loss,357
and the vertical axis to the payoff in case of a loss. The circled dot to the right corresponds to the choice of358
no insurance; it maximizes payoff in case of no loss. The thick curve represents the set of payoffs that are359
achieved by different coverage levels. Finally, A is the convex hull of this set of points; it appears under the360
dashed contour. As seen on the value function graph, for low values of the probability p of loss, the value361
function is linear as the insuree chooses not to purchase insurance. At p∗ (which is approximately 0.334), the362
value function exhibits a kink, and the agent is indifferent between no insurance and a positive indemnity363
level. Finally, for larger values of p, the value function v is twice continuously differentiable with a positive364
second derivative, and the optimal insurance level is a smooth and positive function of the insuree’s belief.365
5. The marginal value of information. The question of the marginal value of information is studied366
in [32]. They provide joint conditions on a parameterized family of information structures together with367
a decision problem such that, when the agent is close to receiving no information at all, the marginal368
value of information is null. Their result was subsequently generalized in [15] and [16], where are provided369
joint conditions on parameterized information and a decision problem leading to zero marginal value of370
information.371
In this Section, we show how our bounds on the value of information, obtained in Sect. 3, apply to372
the marginal value of information. In Subsect. 5.1, we provide separate conditions on the decision problem373
and on the family of parameterized information structures that result in a null value of information. We374
then examine, in Subsect. 5.2, several parameterized families of information structures and rely on our main375
results to study how the marginal value of information varies depending on the decision problem faced.376
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Fig. 2. The action set A on the left and the corresponding value function v = vA in (4.7) for the insurance example on
the right. Parameter values are α = 0.08, f = 10, ̟ = 1000, R = 10.
5.1. Model and first result. Let (qθ)θ>0 be a family of information structures as in (2.5). As in [32],377
we are interested in the so-called marginal value of information:378
(5.1) V + = lim sup
θ→0
1
θ
VoIA(q
θ) .379
The following proposition is a straightforward consequence of Theorems 3.2 and 3.6.380
Proposition 5.1. Assume that381
• either E [d(qθ,∆cA(p¯))] = o(θ),382
• or the decision maker is flexible at prior belief p¯ and E ‖qθ − p¯‖2 = o(θ).383
Then the marginal value of information V + = 0.384
The first condition is met automatically if E ‖qθ − p¯‖ = o(θ). It is also met if, for instance, ∆cA(p¯) has a385
nonempty interior, and posteriors converge to the prior almost surely.386
We now discuss how our approach in Proposition 5.1 compares with the literature. In [32], one finds joint387
conditions on the parameterized information structure (qθ)θ>0 and the decision problem at hand, leading to388
V + = 0. The second case in Proposition 5.1, when the decision maker is flexible, compares with the original389
Radner-Stiglitz assumptions for the smoothness part, but not for the uniqueness of optimal actions. Indeed,390
Assumption (A0) in [32] does not require that A⋆(qθ) be a singleton, for all θ.391
The authors of [15] make a step towards disentangling conditions on the parameterized information392
structure (qθ)θ>0 from conditions on the decision problem that lead to a null marginal value of information.393
However, like [32], they make an assumption on how the optimal action varies with information, which makes394
the comparison with Proposition 5.1 delicate. In addition, [15] provide sufficient conditions for V + = 0 that395
bear on the conditional distribution of the signal knowing the state of nature. Our approach focuses on the396
posterior conditional distribution of the state of nature knowing the signal.397
The authors of [16] provide separate conditions on the parameterized information structure (qθ)θ>0 and398
the decision problem (represented by the action set A) that lead to V + = 0. Their condition “IIDV=0”399
is that lim supθ→0
1
θ
E ‖qθ − p¯‖ = 0, or, equivalently, E ‖qθ − p¯‖ = o(θ), which implies the first item of400
Proposition 5.1. Thus, this latter proposition implies the main result of [16].401
5.2. Examples. Here, we study the marginal value of information for several typical parameterized402
information structures. In the first example, information consists on the observation of a Brownian motion403
with known variance and a drift that depends on the state of nature. In the second example, information404
consists of the observation of a Poisson process whose probability of success depends on the state of nature.405
In these two well studied families in the learning literature, the natural parameterization of information is406
the length of the interval of time during which observation takes place. In the third example, the agent407
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observes a binary signal and the marginal value of information depends on the asymptotic informativeness408
of these signals close to the situation without information.409
In all three following examples we assume binary states of nature, K = {0, 1}, and (by a slight abuse410
of notation) the prior belief on the state being 1 is denoted p¯ ∈]0, 1[. We follow the conditions in Sect. 3411
under which we established bounds on the value of information, and label as: “confident” the case in which p¯412
lies in the interior of the confidence set ∆cA(p¯) (in this case, ∆
c
A(p¯) is a closed nonempty interval
[
pl, ph
]
by413
Proposition A.3, and the value function is linear on this range); “undecided” the case in which the decision414
problem faced by the decision maker is such that there is indifference between two actions at prior belief p¯;415
“flexible” the case in which the optimal action is a smooth function of the belief in a neighborhood of prior416
belief p¯.417
Our aim is to develop estimates of the marginal value of information V + in (5.1). There are three418
possibilities: it can be infinite, null, or positive and finite. We denote these three cases by V + =∞, V + = 0419
and V + ≃ 1 respectively.420
Example 3 (Brownian motion). Frameworks in which agents observe a Brownian motion with known421
volatility and unknown drift include [5, 24, 10], as well as reputation models like [19].422
Assume the agent observes the realization of a Brownian motion with variance 1 and drift k ∈ {0, 1},423
namely dZt = kdt+ dBt, for a small interval of time θ > 0. If we let q
t be the posterior belief at time t, it424
is well-known2 that qt follows a diffusion process of the form dqt = qt(1 − qt)dwt, where w is a standard425
Browian process. Thus, for small values of θ, we have the estimates426
E ‖qθ − p‖ ∼
√
θ , E ‖qθ − p‖2 ∼ θ .427
It follows from Theorems 3.2-3.6 that the marginal value of information is characterized, depending on the428
decision problem, as:429
1. In the confident case, V + = 0,430
2. In the undecided case, V + =∞,431
3. In the flexible case, V + ≃ 1.432
Example 4 (Poisson learning). An important class of models of strategic experimentation (see [25])433
are those in which the agent’s observations are driven by a Poisson process of unknown intensity. Assume434
the agent observes, during a small interval of time θ > 0, a Poisson process with intensity ρk, k ∈ {0, 1},435
where ρ1 > ρ0 > 0. The probability of two successes is negligible compared to the probability of one success436
(of order θ2 compared to θ). A success leads to a posterior that converges from below, as θ → 0, to437
q+ =
p¯ρ1
p¯ρ1 + (1− p¯)ρ0 > p¯ ,438
and happens with probability of order ∼ θ. In the absence of success, the posterior belief converges to the439
prior belief p¯ as θ → 0. As we have seen that the confidence set ∆cA(p¯) is a closed interval
[
pl, ph
]
, we note440
that E
[
d
(
qθ,∆cA(p¯)
)] ∼ θ if q+ > ph, and E [d(qθ,∆cA(p¯))] = o(θ) otherwise. This implies:441
1. In the confident case,442
(a) V + ≃ 1 if q+ > ph,443
(b) V + ≃ 0 if q+ ≤ ph.444
We also have the estimates445
E ‖qθ − p‖ ∼ θ , E ‖qθ − p‖2 ∼ θ ,446
which imply the following estimates on the marginal value of information:447
2. In the undecided case, V + ≃ 1,448
3. In the flexible case, V + ≃ 1.449
Example 5 (Equally likely signals). Here, we consider binary and equally likely signals, which lead to450
a “split” of beliefs around the prior belief p¯. Depending on the precision of these signals as a function of θ,451
2See for instance Lemma 1 in [10] or Lemma 2 in [19].
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the posterior beliefs are p± θα for a certain parameter α > 0 (lower values of α correspond to more spread452
out beliefs around the prior, hence to more accurate information). In this case we easily compute453
E ‖qθ − p‖ = θα , E ‖qθ − p‖2 = θ2α ,454
and we observe that E
[
d(qθ,∆cA(p¯)
]
= 0 for θ small enough. Here again, the marginal value of information455
is deduced from Theorems 3.2–3.6:456
1. In the confident case, V + = 0,457
2. In the undecided case,458
(a) V + =∞ if α < 1,459
(b) V + ≃ 1 if α = 1,460
(c) V + = 0 if α > 1,461
3. In the flexible case,462
(a) V + =∞ if α < 1/2,463
(b) V + ≃ 1 if α = 1/2,464
(c) V + = 0 if α > 1/2.465
Table 2 summarizes the marginal value of information in all of our examples.466
Marginal value of information V + confident undecided flexible
Brownian 0 ∞ 1
Poisson learning 0 or 1 1 1
Equally likely signals, α < 1/2 0 ∞ ∞
Equally likely signals, α = 1/2 0 ∞ 1
Equally likely signals, 1/2 < α < 1 0 ∞ 0
Equally likely signals, α = 1 0 1 0
Equally likely signals, α > 1 0 0 0
Table 2
Marginal value of information in the different examples. The value 1 represents a positive and finite marginal value of
information.
In all cases except one, the marginal value of information is completely determined by the local behavior467
of the value function around the prior. For the Poisson case, the marginal value of information is 0 or468
positive, depending on whether the observation of a success is sufficient to lead to a decision reversal.469
The marginal value of information is always weakly lower in the flexible case than in the undecided case,470
and weakly higher in the undecided case than in other cases. In the confident case, the marginal value of471
information is null, except in the Poisson case with q+ > ph. This is driven by the fact that, in all other472
cases, posteriors are, with high probability, too close to the prior to lead to a decision reversal. In the473
undecided situation, the marginal value of information is always positive or infinite, except for sufficiently474
uninformative binary signals (α > 1). Finally, in the flexible case — the most representative of decision475
problems with a continuum of actions — the value of information is positive or infinite, except with quite476
uninformative binary signals (α > 1/2).477
6. Related literature. The value of information in decision problems is a well-studied question in478
economics and in statistics. The central work in this area is [8], which defines a source of information α479
as more informative than another, β, whenever all agents, independently of their preferences and decision480
problems faced, weakly prefer α to β. Blackwell [8] characterizes precisely this relationship in the following481
terms: α is more informative than β if and only if information from β can be obtained as a garbling of the482
information from α.483
The requirement that all agents agree on their preferences between two statistical experiments is a strong484
one. It implies that this ranking is incomplete, as many such pairs of experiments cannot be ranked according485
to this ordering. Some authors have considered subclasses of decision problems in order to obtain rankings486
that are more complete than Blackwell’s. For instance, [26], [31] and [2] restrict attention to families of487
decision problems that generate monotone decision rules. Focusing on investment decision problems, [12]488
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obtains and characterizes a complete ranking of information sources based on a uniform criterion; [13] uses489
a duality approach to characterize the value of an information purchase that consists of an information490
structure with a price attached to it.491
The present work departs from this literature in the sense that we focus on the value of information for492
a given agent, instead of trying to measure the value of information independently of the agent. Papers [20]493
and [4] characterize the possible preferences for information that any agent can have, letting the decision494
problem vary and the agent’s preferences vary.495
The question of marginal value of information is studied in [32, 15, 16]. They consider parameterized496
information structures, and derive general conditions on the couple consisting of the information structures497
and the decision problem under which the marginal value of information close to no information is zero. Our498
work contributes to this question by allowing us to derive estimates on the value of information based on499
separate conditions on the decision problem and on the information structure. This is the approach we have500
taken in Sect. 5. Our contribution considerably opens the spectrum of possibilities for the marginal value of501
information, by giving conditions under which it can be infinite, null, or positive and finite.502
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Appendix A. Appendix.567
A.1. Revisiting the model of Sect. 2. We revisit the model in Sect. 2 with convex analysis tools to568
prepare the proofs in Sect. A.3. We recall that A ⊂ RK in (2.1) is a nonempty, convex and compact subset569
of RK , called the action set, and that we identify the set Σ of signed measures on K with RK .570
Support function. The support function σA of the action set A is defined by571
(A.1) σA(s) = sup
a∈A
〈s , a〉 , ∀s ∈ Σ .572
The value function vA : ∆→ R in (2.2) is the restriction of σA to probability distributions ∆ = ∆(K) ⊂ Σ:573
(A.2) vA(p) = σA(p) , ∀p ∈ ∆ .574
It is well-known that σA is convex (as the supremum of the family of linear maps 〈· , a〉 for a ∈ A). As the575
action set A is compact, σA(s) takes finite values, hence its effective domain is Σ, hence σA is continuous.576
(Exposed) face. For any signed measure s ∈ Σ, we let577
(A.3) FA(s) = argmax
a′∈A
〈s , a′〉 = {a ∈ A | ∀a′ ∈ A , 〈s , a′〉 ≤ 〈s , a〉} ⊂ A578
be the set of maximizers of a 7→ 〈s , a〉 over A. We call FA(s) the (exposed) face of A in the direction s ∈ Σ.579
As the action set A is convex and compact, the face FA(s) of A in the direction s is nonempty, for any s ∈ Σ,580
and the face is a subset of the boundary ∂A of A: FA(s) ⊂ ∂A , ∀s ∈ Σ. We will use the following property:581
for any nonempty convex set C ⊂ RK and y ∈ RK such that FC(y) 6= ∅, we have582
(A.4) σC(y
′)− σC(y) ≥ σFC(y)(y′ − y) ≥ 〈y′ − y , x′〉 , ∀y′ ∈ RK , ∀x′ ∈ C .583
The set A⋆(p) of optimal actions under belief p in (2.3) coincides with the (exposed) face FA(p) of A in the584
direction p in (A.3):585
(A.5) A⋆(p) = FA(p) , ∀p ∈ ∆ .586
Normal cone. For any payoff vector a in A, we define587
(A.6) NA(a) = {s ∈ Σ | ∀a′ ∈ A , 〈s , a′〉 ≤ 〈s , a〉} ⊂ Σ .588
We call NA(a) the normal cone to the closed convex set A at a ∈ A. Notice that NA(a) is made of signed589
measures in Σ, that are not necessarily beliefs. The set ∆⋆A(a) of beliefs compatible with optimal action a590
in (2.4) is related to the normal cone NA(a) at a in (A.6) by:591
(A.7) ∆⋆A(a) = NA(a) ∩∆ , ∀a ∈ A .592
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Conjugate subsets of actions and beliefs. Exposed face FA and normal cone NA are conjugate as follows:593
(A.8) s ∈ Σ and a ∈ FA(s) ⇐⇒ a ∈ A and s ∈ NA(a) .594
A.2. Background on geometric convex analysis. A nonempty, convex and compact set A ⊂ RK595
is called a convex body of RK [34, p. 8].596
Regular points and smooth bodies. We say that a point a ∈ A is smooth or regular [34, p. 83] if the597
normal cone NA(a) in (A.3) is reduced to a half-line. The set of regular points is denoted by reg(A):598
(A.9) a ∈ reg(A) ⇐⇒ ∃s ∈ Σ , s 6= 0 , NA(a) = R+s .599
Notice that a regular point a necessarily belongs to the boundary ∂A of A: reg(A) ⊂ ∂A. The body A is600
said to be smooth if all boundary points of A are regular (reg(A) = ∂A); in that case, it can be shown that601
its boundary ∂A is a C1 submanifold of RK [34, Theorem 2.2.4, p. 83].602
Spherical image map of A. We denote by S|K|−1 = {s ∈ Σ , ‖s‖ = 1} the unit sphere of the signed603
measures Σ on K (identified with RK with its canonical scalar product). By (A.9), we have that a ∈604
reg(A) ⇐⇒ ∃!s ∈ S|K|−1 , NA(a) = R+s. If a point a ∈ A is regular, the unique outer normal unitary605
vector to A at a is denoted by nA(a), so that NA(a) = R+nA(a). The mapping606
(A.10) nA : reg(A)→ S|K|−1 , where reg(A) ⊂ ∂A ,607
is called the spherical image map of A, or the Gauss map, and is continuous [34, p. 88]. We have608
(A.11) a ∈ reg(A)⇒ NA(a) = R+nA(a) where nA(a) ∈ S|K|−1 .609
Reverse spherical image map of A. We say that a unit signed measure s ∈ S|K|−1 is regular [34, p. 87]610
if the (exposed) face FA(s) of A in the direction s, as defined in (A.3), is reduced to a singleton. The set of611
regular unit signed measures is denoted by regn(A):612
(A.12) s ∈ regn(A) ⇐⇒ s ∈ S|K|−1 and ∃!a ∈ A , FA(s) = {a} .613
For a regular unit signed measure s ∈ S|K|−1, we denote by fA(s) the unique element of FA(s), so that614
FA(s) = {fA(s)}. The mapping615
(A.13) fA : regn(A)→ ∂A , where regn(A) ⊂ S|K|−1 ,616
is called the reverse spherical image map of A, and is continuous [34, p. 88]. We have617
(A.14) s ∈ regn(A)⇒ FA(s) = {fA(s)} .618
Bodies with C2 surface.619
Proposition A.1 (Schneider 2014, p. 113). If the body A has boundary ∂A which is a C2 submanifold620
of RK , then i) all points a ∈ ∂A are regular (reg(A) = ∂A), ii) the spherical image map nA in (A.10) is621
defined over the whole boundary ∂A and is of class C1, iii) the spherical image map nA has the reverse622
spherical image map fA in (A.10) as right inverse, that is, nA ◦ fA = Idregn(A).623
Proof. The first two items can be found in [34, p. 113]. Now, we prove that nA ◦ fA = Idregn(A). As624
fA : regn(A) → ∂A by (A.13), and as nA : ∂A → S|K|−1 by (A.10) since reg(A) = ∂A, the mapping625
nA ◦ fA : regn(A)→ S|K|−1 is well defined. Let s ∈ regn(A). By (A.14), we have that FA(s) = {fA(s)} and626
by (A.11), we have that NA
(
fA(s)
)
= R+nA
(
fA(s)
)
. From (A.8) — stating that exposed face and normal627
cone are conjugate — we deduce that s ∈ R+nA(fA(s)). As s ∈ S|K|−1, we conclude that s = nA
(
fA(s)
)
628
by (A.10).629
Weingarten map. Let a ∈ reg(A) be a regular point, as in (A.9), such that the spherical image map nA630
in (A.10) is differentiable at a, with differential denoted by TanA. The Weingarten map [34, p. 113] TanA :631
Ta∂A→ TnA(a)S|K|−1 linearly maps the tangent space Ta∂A of the boundary ∂A at point a into the tangent632
space TnA(a)S
|K|−1 of the sphere S|K|−1 at nA(a). The eigenvalues of the Weingarten map at a are called633
the principal curvatures of A at a [34, p. 114]; they are nonnegative [34, p. 115]. By definition, the body A634
has positive curvature at a if all principal curvatures at a are positive or, equivalently, if the Weingarten635
map is of maximal rank at a [34, p. 115].636
15
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
Reverse Weingarten map. Let s ∈ regn(A) be a regular unit signed measure such that the reverse637
spherical image map fA in (A.13) is differentiable at s, with differential denoted by TsfA. The reverse638
Weingarten map639
(A.15) TsfA : TsS
|K|−1 → TfA(s)∂A640
maps the tangent space TsS
|K|−1 of the sphere S|K|−1 at s into the tangent space TfA(s)∂A of the bound-641
ary ∂A at point fA(s). The eigenvalues of the reverse Weingarten map at s are called the principal radii of642
curvature of A at s.643
A.3. Proofs of the results in Sect. 3. Using the relations (A.5) and (A.7), we express the proofs of644
the results in Sect. 3 in terms of the sets FA(p) in (2.1) and NA(a) in (A.6) (in the set Σ of signed measures),645
instead of A⋆(p) in (2.3) and ∆⋆A(a) in (2.4) (in the set ∆ of probability measures).646
Value of information. We have seen in (A.2) that the value function vA : ∆→ R in (2.2) is the restriction647
of the support function σA to beliefs in ∆. By definition (2.6) of the value of information, we deduce that,648
for any information structure q as in (2.5), we have:649
(A.16) VoIA(q) = E [σA(q) − σA(p¯)] .650
Lemma A.2. Let us introduce, for all q ∈ ∆,651
ϕ+A(q) = σA(q)− σA(p¯) + σ−A⋆(p¯)(q − p¯) ,(A.17a)652
ϕ−A(q) = σA(q)− σA(p¯)− σA⋆(p¯)(q − p¯) .(A.17b)653654
Then, for any information structure q and for any a ∈ A, we have that655
E
[
ϕ+A(q)
]
= E
[
σA(q)− σA(p¯) + σ−A⋆(p¯)(q− p¯)
]
(A.18a)656
≥ VoIA(q) = E [σA(q) − σA(p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉](A.18b)657
≥ E
[
σA(q)− σA(p¯)− σA⋆(p¯)(q− p¯)
]
= E
[
ϕ−A(q)
]
.(A.18c)658
659
660
Proof. By (A.17), we have, for all q ∈ ∆,661
ϕ+A(q) = σA(q)− σA(p¯) + σ−A⋆(p¯)(q − p¯)(A.19a)662
= sup
a∈A⋆(p¯)
(
σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q − p¯ , a〉
)
(A.19b)663
≥ σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q − p¯ , a〉 , ∀a ∈ A⋆(p¯)(A.19c)664
≥ inf
a∈A⋆(p¯)
(
σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q − p¯ , a〉
)
(A.19d)665
= σA(q)− σA(p¯)− σA⋆(p¯)(q − p¯) = ϕ−A(q) .(A.19e)666667
By taking the expectation, we obtain (A.18), using (A.16) and the property that E [q− p¯] = 0 in (2.5).668
Confidence set and indifference kernel. We start by providing characterizations of the confidence set669
∆cA(p¯) in (3.1) and of the indifference kernel Σ
i
A(p¯) in (3.5), in terms of FA(p) in (A.3) and NA(a) in (A.6).670
Proposition A.3.671
1. The confidence set ∆cA(p¯) of (3.1) is the nonempty closed and convex set672
(A.20) ∆cA(p¯) =
⋂
a∈A⋆(p¯)
∆⋆A(a) =
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NA(a) ∩∆ .673
2. Let p ∈ ∆. We have that674
p ∈ ∆cA(p¯) ⇐⇒ FA(p¯) ⊂ FA(p)(A.21a)675
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⇐⇒ σA(p)− σA(p¯)− 〈p− p¯ , a〉 = 0 , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯)(A.21b)676
⇐⇒ σA(p)− σA(p¯) + σ−A⋆(p)(p− p¯) = 0 .(A.21c)677678
679
3. The indifference kernel ΣiA(p¯) of (3.5) is the vector subspace680
ΣiA(p¯) = [FA(p¯)− FA(p¯)]⊥ = [A⋆(p¯)−A⋆(p¯)]⊥ =
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NFA(p¯)(a) .681
Proof.682
1. Express (3.1) using (A.7).683
2. We prove the three equivalences in (A.21).684
(a) Let p ∈ ∆. Using the property (A.8) that exposed face FA and normal cone NA are conjugate,685
we obtain: p ∈ ∆cA(p¯) ⇐⇒ p ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p)
NA(a) by (A.20)686
⇐⇒ a ∈ FA(p) , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯) by (A.8) ⇐⇒ FA(p¯) ⊂ FA(p) .687688
(b) Let p ∈ ∆. We have that689
σA(p)− σA(p¯)− 〈p− p¯ , a〉 = 0 , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯)690
⇐⇒ σA(p) = 〈p , a〉 , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯)691692
because σA(p¯) = 〈p¯ , a〉 for any a ∈ FA(p¯), since FA(p¯) is the set A⋆(p) of optimal actions under
prior belief p¯ by (2.3) and (A.3)693
⇐⇒ p ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NA(a)(by definition (A.6) of NA(a))694
⇐⇒ p ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NA(a) ∩∆ = ∆cA(p¯) by (A.20).695
696
(c) For any a ∈ A, we define the function697
(A.22) ϕa(q) = σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q − p¯ , a〉 , ∀q ∈ ∆ .698
By (A.4) and (A.21b), we have that699
∀a ∈ FA(p¯) , ∀q ∈ ∆ , ϕa(q) ≥ 0 ,(A.23a)700
∀a ∈ FA(p¯) , ∀q ∈ ∆cA(p¯) , ϕa(q) = 0 .(A.23b)701702
Let p ∈ ∆. Using (A.23a), we deduce from (A.21b) and from the compacity of FA(p¯) that703
p ∈ ∆cA(p¯) ⇐⇒ infa∈FA(p¯)
(
σA(p) − σA(p¯) − 〈p− p¯ , a〉
)
= 0. We conclude with (A.19d)–704
(A.19e).705
3. Express (3.5) using (A.5). Then, use the definition of NFA(p¯)(a) in (A.6).706
This ends the proof.707
A.3.1. Valuable information.708
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let a ∈ FA(p¯) and q be an information structure as in (2.5). We have that709
VoIA(q) = 0 ⇐⇒ E [σA(q)− σA(p¯)] = 0 by (A.16)710
⇐⇒ E [σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉] = 0 , as E [q− p¯] = 0711
⇐⇒ σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉 = 0 , P− a.s.
(because σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉 ≥ 0 by (A.4) since a ∈ FA(p¯))
712
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⇐⇒ σA(q) = 〈q , a〉 , P− a.s.(because σA(p¯) = 〈p¯ , a〉 since a ∈ FA(p¯))713
⇐⇒ P {a ∈ FA(q)} = 1714
⇐⇒ P {〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A} = 1 .715716
Let F ⊂ FA(p¯) be a dense subset of the compact FA(p¯) of RK . We immediately get from the last717
equality that VoIA(q) = 0 ⇒ P {〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ F} = 1. As the set {a ∈ FA(p¯) |718
〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A} is closed (for any outcome in the underlying sample space Ω), we get that719
{〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ F} ⊂ {〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ F}. We deduce from the last720
equality that VoIA(q) = 0 ⇒ P {〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ F
}
= 1. Now, since F = FA(p¯), we721
finally get that VoIA(q) = 0⇒ P {〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯)} = 1. In other words, we have722
obtained that, by definition (A.6) of the normal cone NA(a): VoIA(q) = 0⇒ q ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NA(a) , P−a.s..723
Since q ∈ ∆, we conclude by (A.20) that724
VoIA(q) = 0⇒ q ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p)
NA(a) ∩∆ =
⋂
a∈A⋆(p)
∆⋆A(a) = ∆
c
A(p) .725
Revisiting the proof backward, or using (A.21b), we easily see that q ∈ ∆cA(p) , P − a.s. ⇒ VoIA(q) = 0.726
This ends the proof.727
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let q be an information structure as in (2.5).728
First, we show the upper estimate CAE d
(
q,∆cA(p¯)
) ≥ VoIA(q) in (3.4). For this purpose, we consider729
a ∈ A and we show that the function ϕa in (A.22) is such that730
(A.26) ϕa(q) ≤ sup
a′∈A
‖a− a′‖ inf
p∈∆c
A
(p¯)
‖p− q‖ .731
Indeed, we have that, for any p ∈ ∆cA(p¯),732
ϕa(q) = ϕa(q)− ϕa(p) by (A.23b) since p ∈ ∆cA(p¯)733
= σA(q)− σA(p)− 〈q − p , a〉 by (A.22)734
= σA−a(q)− σA−a(p) by (A.1)735
≤ sup
a′∈A−a
‖a′‖ × ‖p− q‖ by (A.1) = sup
a′∈A
‖a− a′‖ × ‖p− q‖ .736
737
By taking the infimum with respect to all p ∈ ∆cA(p¯), we obtain (A.26). Then, we deduce that738
VoIA(q) = E [ϕa(q)] , ∀a ∈ A by (A.18b)739
= inf
a∈A
E [ϕa(q)] ≤ inf
a∈A
sup
a′∈A
‖a− a′‖ × E
[
inf
p∈∆cA(p¯)
‖p− q‖
]
by (A.26).740
741
With CA = infa∈A supa′∈A ‖a − a′‖ and (3.3), this gives the upper estimate CAE d
(
q,∆cA(p¯)
) ≥ VoIA(q)742
in (3.4).743
Second, we show the lower estimate VoIA(q) ≥ cp¯,A,εP{q 6∈ ∆cA,ε(p¯)} in (3.4). We consider an open744
subset Q of ∆ that contains the confidence set ∆cA(p), that is, ∆cA(p¯) ⊂ Q. By Lemma A.4 right below,745
there exists an a ∈ FA(p¯) such that the continuous function ϕa in (A.22) is strictly positive on ∆cA(p¯)c. As746
Qc ⊂ ∆cA(p¯)c and Qc is a closed subset of the compact ∆, we can define cp¯,A = infp6∈Q ϕa(p) > 0. We deduce747
that748
VoIA(q) = E [ϕa(q)] by (A.18b)749
= E
[
1q∈∆c
A
(p¯)ϕa(q) + 1q 6∈∆c
A
(p¯)ϕa(q)
]
750
= E
[
1q 6∈∆cA(p¯)ϕa(q)
]
by (A.23b)751
≥ E [1q 6∈Qϕa(q)] ≥ E [1q 6∈Qcp¯,A] = cp¯,AP{q 6∈ Q} .752753
With Q = ∆cA,ε(p¯), we put cp¯,A,ε = infp6∈∆cA,ε(p¯) ϕa(p) > 0.754
This ends the proof.755
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Lemma A.4. There exists at least one a ∈ FA(p¯) such that the function ϕa in (A.22) is strictly positive756
on the complementary set ∆cA(p¯)
c.757
Proof. We consider two cases, depending whether FA(p¯) is a singleton or not.758
Suppose that FA(p¯) is a singleton {a}. By (A.21b), we have that q 6∈ ∆cA(p¯) ⇐⇒ ϕa(q) > 0.759
Suppose that FA(p¯) is a not singleton. Recall that the affine hull aff(S) of a subset S of R
K is the760
intersection of all affine manifolds containing S, and that the relative interior ri(C) of a nonempty convex761
set C ⊂ RK is the nonempty interior of C for the topology relative to the affine hull aff(C) [22, p. 103].762
We prove that any a ∈ ri (FA(q)) answers the question. Let a ∈ ri (FA(q)) be fixed. For any q 6∈ ∆cA(p¯),763
by (A.21a) we have that FA(p¯) 6⊂ FA(q). Therefore, there exists a¯ ∈ FA(p¯) such that a¯ 6∈ FA(q), that is, such764
that σA(q) > 〈q , a¯〉. As a ∈ ri
(
FA(q)
)
, there exists a′ ∈ ri (FA(q)) such that a = λa′+(1−λ)a¯ for a certain765
λ ∈]0, 1[. Since σA(q) ≥ 〈q , a′〉 (by definition (A.1) of σA) and σA(q) > 〈q , a¯〉 (as a¯ 6∈ FA(q)), we deduce766
that σA(q) = λσA(q) + (1 − λ)σA(q) > λ 〈q , a′〉 + (1 − λ) 〈q , a¯〉 = 〈q , a〉, where we used the property that767
λ ∈]0, 1[. Using the definition (A.22) of the function ϕa, we have obtained that q 6∈ ∆cA(p¯)⇒ ϕa(q) > 0.768
This ends the proof.769
A.3.2. Undecided.770
Proof of Theorem 3.4. We prove the three inequalities in (3.6).771
I). We prove the upper inequality CAE ‖q− p¯‖ ≥ VoIA(q) in (3.6).772
By definition (A.1) of a support function, we have that σA(·) ≤ ‖A‖× ‖ · ‖, where ‖A‖ = sup{‖a‖ , a ∈773
A} < +∞. Thus CA = ‖A‖ in the left hand side inequality in (3.6).774
II). We prove the middle inequality VoIA(q) ≥ VoIA⋆(p¯)(q) in (3.6).775
For all s ∈ Σ, we have that776
σA(s)− σA(p¯) ≥σFA(p¯)(s− p¯) by (A.4) since FA(p¯) 6= ∅(A.30a)777
= 〈s− p¯ , a〉 , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯) by definition of σFA(p¯)(A.30b)778
=σFA(p¯)(s)− σFA(p¯)(p¯) by definition of σFA(p¯).(A.30c)779780
By taking the expectation E , we obtain that781
VoIA(q) =E [σA(q) − σA(p¯)] by (2.6) and (A.2)(A.31a)782
≥E [σFA(p¯)(q− p¯)] by (A.30a)(A.31b)783
=E
[
σFA(p¯)(q) − σFA(p¯)(p¯)
]
by (A.30c)(A.31c)784
=VoIFA(p¯)(q) by (2.6) and (A.2).785786
This ends the proof of the middle inequality.787
III). We prove the right hand side inequality VoIA⋆(p¯)(q) ≥ E ‖q− p¯‖ΣiA(p¯) in (3.6).788
Let n be the dimension of the affine hull aff
(
FA(p¯)
)
of FA(p¯), and let a1, . . . , an be n actions in FA(p¯)789
that generate aff
(
FA(p¯)
)
. We put790
(A.32) T = {a1, . . . , an} ⊂ FA(p¯) so that aff
(
FA(p¯)
)
= aff{a1, . . . , an} = aff(T ) .791
We will now show that ‖ · ‖Σi
A
(p¯) =
1
n
σT−T (·) is a seminorm with kernel (FA(p¯)− FA(p¯))⊥ that satisfies the792
right hand side inequality in (3.6).793
First, the support function σT−T is a seminorm with kernel (T − T )⊥, as easily seen. Now, we also794
easily see that, for any subset S ⊂ RK , one has (S − S)⊥ = ( aff(S − S))⊥ = ( aff(S) − aff(S))⊥. Using795
these equalities with S = T and S = FA(p¯), we deduce that (T − T )⊥ = (FA(p¯) − FA(p¯))⊥, since aff(T ) =796
aff
(
FA(p¯)
)
by (A.32). Second, we show that the right hand side inequality in (3.6) is satisfied. We have797
VoIA(q) ≥ E
[
σFA(p¯)(q− p¯)
]
by (A.31b)798
≥ E [σT (q− p¯)]
(because T ⊂ FA(p¯) and support functions (A.1) are monotone with respect to set inclusion)
799
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= E [σT (q− p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉] , ∀a ∈ A because E [〈q− p¯ , a〉] = 0.800
= E [σT−a(q− p¯)] , ∀a ∈ A because σT−a = σT+{−a} = σT + σ{−a}.801802
Indeed, support functions transform a Minkowski sum of sets into a sum of support functions [22, p. 226].803
Using again this property, we obtain that VoIA(q) ≥ 1n
∑n
i=1 E [σT−ai(q− p¯)] = 1nE
[
σ∑n
i=1(T−ai)
(q− p¯)].804
Now, as T = {a1, . . . , an}, it is easy to see that the sum
∑n
i=1(T − ai) contains any element of the form805
ak−al = (a1−a1)+ · · ·+(al−1−al−1)+(ak−al)+(al+1−al+1)+ · · ·+(an−an) ∈
∑n
i=1(T −ai). As support806
functions are monotone with respect to set inclusion, we deduce that σ∑n
i=1(T−ai)
≥ σ{ak−al,k,l=1,...,n} =807
σT−T and that VoIA(q) ≥ 1nE
[
σ{ak−al,k,l=1,...,n}(q− p¯)
]
= 1
n
E [σT−T (q− p¯)] = E ‖q− p¯‖Σi
A
(p¯).808
This ends the proof.809
A.3.3. Flexible.810
Proof of Proposition 3.5. All the reminders on geometric convex analysis in Sect. A.2 were done with811
outer normal vectors belonging to the unit sphere of signed measures. Now, as we work with beliefs —812
positive measures of mass 1 — we are going to adapt these concepts. We consider the diffeomorphism813
(A.34) ν : S|K|−1 ∩ RK+ → ∆ , s 7→
s
〈s , 1〉 ,814
that maps unit positive measures into probability measures, with inverse ν−1 : ∆→ S|K|−1∩RK+ , p 7→ p‖p‖ .815
Since, by assumption, the action set A has boundary ∂A which is a C2 submanifold of RK , we know by816
Proposition A.1 that the spherical image map nA : ∂A→ S|K|−1 in (A.10) is well defined, is of class C1, and817
has for right inverse the reverse spherical image map fA : regn(A)→ ∂A in (A.13), that is, nA◦fA = Idregn(A).818
The set of relevant regular points is the subset of the set reg(A) of regular points defined by819
(A.35) a ∈ reg+(A) ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ ∆ , NA(a) = R+p .820
For a regular action a ∈ reg+(A), there is only one probability p ∈ ∆ such that NA(a) = R+p, and it is821
p = ν
(
nA(a)
)
. We have a ∈ reg+(A) ⇒ NA(a) = R+ν
(
nA(a)
)
where ν
(
nA(a)
) ∈ ∆. The set of regular822
probabilities is regn+(A) =
(
R
∗
+regn(A)
)
∩ ∆. For a regular probability p ∈ regn+(A), there is only one823
action a ∈ ∂A such that FA(p) = {a}, and it is a = fA
(
ν−1(p)
)
. Indeed, by definition (A.3) of the (exposed)824
face, we have that FA(λs) = FA(s) , ∀λ ∈ R∗+ , ∀s ∈ Σ , s 6= 0. Therefore, we have that825
(A.36) p ∈ regn+(A)⇒ FA(p) = {fA
(
ν−1(p)
)} .826
The following mappings are well defined: ν ◦nA : reg+(A)→ ∆ and fA ◦ ν−1 : regn+(A)→ ∂A, and we have827
that (ν ◦ nA) ◦ (fA ◦ ν−1) = Idregn+(A).828
• Item 2 ⇒ Item 1.829
Suppose that the face FA(p¯) is a singleton {a♯} and the curvature of the boundary ∂A of payoffs830
at a♯ is positive. Since, by assumption, the action set A has boundary ∂A which is a C2 submanifold831
of RK , we know that the spherical image map nA in (A.10) is defined over the whole boundary ∂A832
and is of class C1, and its differential is the Weingarten map. As the curvature of the boundary ∂A of833
payoffs at a♯ is positive, the Weingarten map Ta♯nA is of maximal rank at a
♯ [34, p. 115]. Therefore,834
by the inverse function theorem, there exists an open neighborhood A of a♯ in A such that nA(A)835
is an open neighborhood of nA
(
a♯
)
in S|K|−1, and such that the restriction nA : A → nA(A) of the836
spherical image map in (A.10) is a diffeomorphism. By item iii) in Proposition A.1, we have that837
nA
(
a♯
)
= p¯‖p¯‖ and the local inverse coincides with the restriction fA : nA(A) → A of the reverse838
spherical image map in (A.13). As nA(A) is an open neighborhood of p¯‖p¯‖ in S|K|−1, and as the839
prior belief p¯ has full support, we deduce that ν
(
nA(A)
)
is an open neighborhood of p¯ in ∆, where840
the diffeomorphism ν is defined in (A.34). We easily deduce that fA ◦ ν−1 : ν
(
nA(A)
) → A is a841
diffeomorphism. By (A.36), we conclude that fA ◦ ν−1 is the restriction of the set-valued mapping842
FA : ∆⇒ A, p 7→ FA(p) in (3.7).843
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• Item 1 ⇒ Item 3.844
Suppose that the set-valued mapping FA : ∆⇒ A, p 7→ FA(p) in (3.7) is a local diffeomorphism at p¯.845
By definition (A.12) of the set of regular unit signed measures, there exists an open neighborhood ∐846
of p¯ in ∆ such that ∐ ⊂ regn+(A), where the set of relevant regular points is defined in (A.35). In847
addition, the mapping fA ◦ ν−1 : ∐ → fA
(
ν−1(∐)) is a diffeomorphism.848
As FA(p) = {fA
(
ν−1(p)
)}, for all beliefs p ∈ ∐, we know that the support function σA is differentiable849
and that its gradient is ∇pσA = fA
(
ν−1(p)
)
[22, p. 251]. As fA ◦ ν−1 is a local diffeomorphism at p¯,850
and as the mapping ν in (A.34) is a diffeomorphism, we deduce that the support function σA is851
twice differentiable with Hessian having full rank. As the value function vA is the restriction of σA852
to ∆, we conclude that vA is twice differentiable at p¯ and the Hessian is positive definite.853
• Item 3 ⇒ Item 2.854
Suppose that the value function vA is twice differentiable at p¯ and the Hessian is positive definite.855
On the one hand, as the prior p¯ has full support, there exists an open neighborhood ∐ of p¯ in ∆856
such that vA is differentiable on ∐. On the other hand, as the support function σA is positively857
homogeneous, and by (A.2), we have that858
(A.37) σA(s) = 〈s , 1〉 ×
(
vA ◦ ν
)
(s) , ∀s ∈ S|K|−1 ∩ RK+ .859
Therefore, as the mapping ν in (A.34) is a diffeomorphism, the support function σA is differentiable860
on the open neighborhood ν−1(∐) of ν−1(p¯) = p¯‖p¯‖ in S|K|−1 ∩ RK+ .861
Since, on the one hand, a convex function with effective domain RK is differentiable at s if and only862
if the subdifferential at s is a singleton [22, p. 251], and, on the other hand, the face FA(s) is the863
subdifferential at s of the support function σA [22, p. 258], we conclude that the face FA(s) of A in864
the direction s ∈ ν−1(∐) is a singleton.865
Therefore, by definition (A.12) of the set of regular unit signed measures, we have that ν−1(∐) ⊂866
regn(A). In addition, the restriction fA : ν
−1(∐)→ fA
(
ν−1(∐)) of the reverse spherical image map867
in (A.13) is well defined, and we have that ∇sσA = fA(s) , ∀s ∈ ν−1(∐). Therefore, the mapping868
fA : ν
−1(∐)→ fA
(
ν−1(∐)) is differentiable at ν−1(p¯) = p¯‖p¯‖ , and has full rank. Indeed, σA is twice869
differentiable at ν−1(p¯) = p¯‖p¯‖ , and the Hessian is positive definite. This comes from (A.37), where870
the mapping ν in (A.34) is a C∞ diffeomorphism and the value function vA is twice differentiable871
at p¯ with positive definite Hessian.872
As fA is is differentiable at
p¯
‖p¯‖ and has full rank, the reverse Weingarten map TsfA in (A.15) is873
well defined and has full rank. Therefore, the principal radii of curvature of A at p¯‖p¯‖ are positive.874
Letting a♯ = fA
(
p¯
‖p¯‖
)
, we conclude that FA(p¯) = {a♯} and that the curvature of the boundary ∂A875
of payoffs at a♯ is positive.876
This ends the proof.877
Proof of Theorem 3.6. We suppose that the value function vA in (2.2) is twice differentiable at p¯, with878
positive definite Hessian. We denote FA(p¯) = {a♯}.879
First, we show that the function g(p) =
vA(p)−vA(p¯)−〈p−p¯ ,a♯〉
‖p−p¯‖2 is continuous and positive on ∆. Indeed,880
g is continuous on ∆\{p¯}, and also at p¯ since the value function vA is twice differentiable at p¯. In addition,881
g(p¯) > 0 since the Hessian of vA at p¯ is positive definite. We have g ≥ 0 on ∆\{p¯}, because FA(p¯) = {a♯} is882
the subdifferential at p¯ of the support function σA, and by (A.2). We now prove by contradiction that g > 0.883
If there existed a belief p 6= p¯ such that g(p) = 0, we would have vA(p)−vA(p¯)−
〈
p− p¯ , a♯〉 = 0; this equality884
would then hold true over the whole segment [p, p¯], and we would conclude that the second derivative of vA885
at p¯ along the (nonzero) direction p− p¯ would be zero; this would contradict the assumption that the Hessian886
of vA at p¯ is positive definite. Therefore, we conclude that g > 0. Second, letting Cp¯,A > 0 and cp¯,A > 0887
be the maximum and the minimum of the function g > 0 on the compact set ∆, we easily deduce (3.8)888
from (2.6).889
This ends the proof.890
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